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Is Realism about Consciousness 
Compatible with a Scientifically 
Respectable World View?   
A response to Keith Frankish’s ‘Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness’  
 
Illusionism is the view that the apparent reality of phenomenal consciousness is a powerful illusion; 
illusionists deny that the anything really has phenomenal consciousness. This is a position which 
deserves exploration, and Keith Frankish’s recent defence of it is rigorous and compelling. It also 
brings together, perhaps for the first time, the varied literature on this topic.  
Many philosophers will protest that illusionism is obviously false, or that the assertion of it is 
somehow how self-defeating. I am inclined to think both of these things. However, my aim in this 
piece is not to argue that illusionism cannot be true, but rather to undermine the motivation for it. 
Frankish believes that realism about phenomenal consciousness is at odds with scientifically 
respectable metaphysics. I hope to show that this is not the case, or at least that Frankish has given 
us no grounds for thinking that it is. 
Is Illusionism coherent?  
Phenomenal consciousness is typically defined as follows: 
Something is phenomenally conscious if and only if there is something that it’s like to be it. 
In his paper Frankish articulates a deflationary understanding of ‘what it’s like’ talk, and hence for 
the sake of clarity we can add that phenomenal consciousness involves experience of qualities: the 
redness of red experiences, the bitter quality involved in the experience of biting into a lemon, the 
qualitative character of heat sensations. Indeed it is precisely the qualitative character of 
consciousness that Frankish finds problematic. In what follows I will use the word ‘consciousness’ to 
refer to phenomenal consciousness.   
The illusionist accepts that human beings represent states of consciousness, and indeed that we 
typically believe that states of consciousness exist. But she also holds that all such representations 
are non-veridical, and the corresponding beliefs false. Just like beliefs about the Loch Ness Monster, 
beliefs about consciousness fail to correspond to anything real.  
Beliefs are a kind of propositional thought. Is it coherent to accept the reality of thought whilst 
denying the reality of consciousness? That depends on whether or not there is a constitutive 
relationship between thought and consciousness. Frankish assumes throughout the paper that we 
can account for thoughts, such as beliefs and other mental representations, without the postulation 
of consciousness. In this he follows the dominant view in analytic philosophy that there is no 
essential connection between thought and consciousness. This view was largely unquestioned in the 
twentieth century.1 However, there is now a growing movement in analytic philosophy defending 
the thesis that thoughts, and indeed mental representations in general, are identical with (or directly 
                                                          
1 There were a few opponents this consensus, e.g. John Searle (1984), Galen Strawson (1994) and Charles 
Siewart (1998).  
constituted of) forms of phenomenal consciousness. Uriah Kriegal has dubbed this movement ‘the 
Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.’2 
Clearly if the convictions of the Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program turn out to be correct, 
then illusionism involves a straightforward contradiction: you can’t assert the existence of thought 
but deny the existence of consciousness if thought just is a (highly evolved) form of consciousness. I 
believe there is strong reason to accept that thought is a form of consciousness, and hence strong 
reason to think that illusionism is indeed incoherent. However, I will not have space to defend this 
here. I merely note that illusionism depends on an assumption which Frankish has not defended in 
this paper: that mental representation is not dependent on phenomenal consciousness. In what 
follows I will grant him this assumption for the sake of argument.  
Is Consciousness Anomalous? 
Frankish’s principal motivation for illusionism is his conviction that consciousness is an ‘anomalous’ 
phenomenon, at odds with our scientific picture of reality. It might be useful to distinguish two ways 
in which a certain thesis might be in tension with our scientific knowledge of the world: 
Being Anomalous by Inconsistency – A thesis is anomalous by inconsistency iff it is 
inconsistent with what we know (or have good to reason to believe) about reality through 
empirical methods. An example of this is the creationist thesis that the world is between 
6,000 and 10,000 years old. 
Being Anomalous by Irreducibility – A thesis is anomalous by irreducibility iff it requires 
ontological commitments over and above those required by what we know (or have good 
reason to believe) about reality through empirical methods. A plausible example of this is 
the thesis that there is a non-interventionist God.3 
At various points Frankish seems to suggest that consciousness is anomalous is both of these senses. 
In the next section I will argue that the reality of consciousness is not anomalous by inconsistency. I 
will then go on to argue that, although there may be grounds for thinking that consciousness may be 
anomalous by irreducibility, Frankish has given us no reason to think that this fact is in any way 
problematic for the consciousness realist.  
Is Phenomenal Consciousness Anomalous by Inconsistency?  
Why might one think that the reality of consciousness is inconsistent with what we know about 
reality scientifically? Frankish supports the standard arguments of Chalmers, Jackson and others to 
the conclusion that states of consciousness are non-physical.4 This in itself does not entail an 
inconsistency with what we know empirically; the postulation of non-physical properties may merely 
add to what we know about the world empirically, without contradicting it. However, inconsistency 
may arise when we try to find a causal role for such non-physical consciousness in the material 
world.  
Paul Churchland, among others, has argued that giving a causal role to non-physical properties 
violates principles of energy conservation: 
                                                          
2 Kriegel 2013. 
3 This thesis is anomalous by irreducibility only if design arguments for the existence of God fail. 
4 Chalmers 1996, 2009, Jackson 1982, 1984. I critique these forms of the argument and suggest an alternative 
in Goff 2011 and Goff MS. 
…as has been known for more than fifty years…forms of Dualism…fly in the face of basic 
physics itself…since any position that includes non-physical elements in the causal dynamics 
of the brain must violate both the law that energy is neither created nor destroyed, and the 
law that the total momentum in any closed system is always conserved. In short, you simply 
can’t get a change in any aspect of the physical brain (for that would causally require both 
energy changes and momentum changes) save by a compensatory change in some other 
physical aspect of the brain, which will thereby lay claim to being the cause at issue. There is 
simply no room in a physical system for ghosts of any kind to intervene in some fashion to 
change its dynamical behavior. Any physical system is ‘dynamically closed’ under the laws of 
Physics. (Indeed, it was this very difficulty, over a century ago, that initially motivated the 
desperate invention of Epiphenomenalism in the first place.)5 
This argument is far too hasty. As David Papineau has pointed out fundamental mental forces need 
not constitute a counterexample to the principle of the conservation of energy, so long as those 
forces act conservatively; so long as they ‘operate in such a way as to “pay back” all the energy they 
“borrow” and vice-versa.’ 
…the conservation of energy in itself does not tell which basic forces operate in the physical 
universe. Are gravity and impact the only basic forces? What about electro-magnetism? 
Nuclear forces? And so on. Clearly the conservation of energy as such leaves it open exactly 
which basic forces exist. It requires only that, whatever they are, they operate 
deterministically and conservatively.6 
We must distinguish this kind of argument, based on conservation of energy, from more common 
and more promising arguments based on the alleged causal closure of the physical. Frankish’s 
concerns about the causal role of phenomenal consciousness are of the latter kind: 
Non-physical properties can have no effects in a world that is closed under causation, as 
ours appears to be, and the mind sciences show no independent need to refer to exotic 
physical processes, such as quantum-mechanical ones. The threat of epiphenomenalism 
hangs over such theories.7 
This familiar worry is perhaps most associated with Jaegwan Kim.8 If we grant the premise that 
consciousness is non-physical, then we can turn this worry into an argument that non-
epiphenomenal consciousness is anomalous by contradiction: 
1. The thesis of causal closure (i.e. the thesis that every physical event has a sufficient physical 
cause) is empirically well supported. 
2. Consciousness is non-physical 
3. If consciousness exists, and it is not epiphenomenal (i.e. it has a causal impact on the 
physical world), then there would be physical events (i.e. the events caused by 
consciousness) which have a non-physical rather than a physical cause, in violation of causal 
closure.9 
                                                          
5 Churchland 2014. 
6 Papineau 2002: 252.  
7 P. 13 
8 Kim 1989. 
9 The truth of this premise relies on an implicit assumption that the effects of consciousness are not 
systematically over-determined. This premise is usually explicit in discussions of this issue, but I leave it implicit 
here in order to keep things simple. 
4. Therefore, either consciousness is epiphenomenal or its existence is inconsistent with an 
empirically well supported thesis (i.e. causal closure).  
The thesis that the physical world is causally closed is often stated, but very rarely defended.  
Following this trend Frankish does not defend, nor reference any defence of, the principle, beyond 
saying that it ‘appears to be true’. Peter Rauschenberger has recently given a powerful critique of 
the scant empirical defence of causal closure which has appeared in the literature.10 
Moreover, as Frankish points out, even if causal closure is true, there is a way of reconciling the non-
physicality of consciousness with the causal closure of the physical world: Russellian monism.11 
Russellian monism results from a recent rediscovery of the approach to the mind-body problem 
defended (independently) by Russell and Eddington in the 1920s.12 The starting point for the view is 
Russell’s observation that the physical sciences, such as physics, chemistry and neuroscience, 
characterise physical properties dispositionally, i.e. solely in terms of what those properties do. In 
neuroscience, for example, a given brain state is characterised in terms of (i) its causal role in the 
brain, (ii) its chemical constituents. Those chemical constituents are then characterised in terms of (i) 
their causal role, and (ii) their physical constituents. And the basic physical constituents are 
characterised entirely dispostionally; mass, for instance, is characterised in terms of gravitational 
attraction and the disposition to resist acceleration.   
Bearing this in mind, consider a case in which a certain brain state is strongly correlated with a 
certain conscious state. Suppose, for the sake of having an example, that we discover a strong 
correlation between hunger and ventromedial hypothalamus stimulation (VHS). Physical science tells 
us nothing about what VHS is beyond what it does (and what its constituents do). Now there are 
powerful arguments to the conclusion that there must be more to the nature of a property than its 
causal role, and if those arguments are successful then there must be more to VHS than what 
physical science tells us about it.13 But even if those arguments don’t work, it is surely coherent to 
suppose that there is more to VHS that its causal role, that VHS has a categorical nature which 
underlies its dispositional characteristics. If Frankish thinks that the rather orthodox philosophical 
view that dispositional properties are grounded in categorical properties in incoherent or 
implausible, then he owes us an argument to justify that conclusion. 
The Russellian monist has a proposal for what that the categorical nature of VHS is: the feeling of 
hunger. According to Russellian monism, physical science describes VHS ‘from the outside’, i.e. it 
tells us what it does; whilst in introspection we know VHS ‘from the inside’ as the conscious 
experience of hunger. VHS is a single state with a qualitative intrinsic nature which underlies the 
dispositional characteristics which are the focus of empirical science. 
Now if pain is a non-physical state, and pain is the intrinsic nature of VHS, does it follow that VHS is a 
non-physical state? In fact, in the context of Russellian monism we need to note certain ambiguities 
in the term ‘physical property’. If Russellian monism is true, then VHS is referred to by the predicates 
of neuroscience, and in that sense VHS is ‘physical’; but it has a categorical nature which is not 
revealed by physical science, and in that sense it is ‘non-physical’.14  
                                                          
10 Rauschenberger MS. Papineau 2001 is perhaps the best defence of causal closure, although even here the 
empirical support is explored in very little detail.  
11 For a recent collection of essays on Russellian monism see Alter and Nagasawa 2015. 
12 Russell 1927, Eddington 1928. 
13 Robinson 1982, Blackburn 1980, Goff MS, chapter 6. 
14 Stoljar 2001 outlines a detailed account of these two definitions of physical. 
It is in the latter sense that the standard ‘anti-physicalist arguments’, such as the zombie 
conceivability argument and the knowledge argument, try to demonstrate that consciousness is 
‘non-physical’. But consciousness only needs to be ‘physical’ in the former sense in order to secure 
its causal role. If the conscious feeling of hunger is the categorical nature of ventromedial 
hypothalamus stimulation, then it is in virtue of being so that it is ensured a genuine causal role in 
the material world. 
Frankish objects to Russellian monism on the grounds that ‘it involves huge profligacy with 
phenomenal properties and preserves the potency of consciousness only at the cost of making all 
physical causation phenomenal.’15 However, this objection assumes that Russellian monism entails 
panpsychism, which is not the case. Although there are panpsychist versions of Russellian monism, 
such as the view of Strawson which Frankish references, there are also non-panpsychist versions.16 It 
is perfectly possible to be a Russellain monist whilst only believing in those forms of consciousness 
we have a pre-theoretical commitment to. 
There is therefore no reason to suppose that there is any tension between full-blooded realism 
about non-epiphenomenal qualitative phenomenal consciousness and our empirical knowledge of 
the world; there are no grounds for thinking that non-epiphenomenal consciousness is anomalous 
by contradiction. Even if we have reason to believe that the physical world is causally closed, and 
this has not been adequately defended, there is way of reconciling causal closure with a 
commitment to conscious states with are both causally efficacious and non-physical (‘non-physical’ 
in the sense of having a nature not fully captured by physical science, and this is all that is 
demonstrated by the standard ‘anti-physicalist’ arguments). 
Is it a Problem if Phenomenal Consciousness is Anomalous by Irreducibility? 
Russellian monism allows us to accommodate full-blooded qualitative consciousness into the 
physical world without contradicting anything we know about the world empirically. But it does 
involve adding to what we know about the world empirically (I am here taking ‘empirical’ knowledge 
to be knowledge which results from third-person observation and experiment). Both the Russellian 
monist and the illusionist accept that states of phenomenal consciousness are not accessible to third 
person scientific methods, and are not explicable in terms of the dispositional properties that 
feature in physical science. If this is correct, then realism about consciousness takes us beyond the 
metaphysical commitments of third-person science. 
Frankish assumes throughout the paper that it is problematic to go beyond the metaphysical 
commitments of third-person science. But why should we think this? It goes without saying that we 
should not believe in things that we have no reason to believe in. But the realist would claim that 
our apparent introspective awareness of our own consciousness does give us reason to believe in 
the reality of consciousness. If we have reason to believe in consciousness, and if there is good 
reason to believe (as Frankish thinks there is) that consciousness cannot be explained in terms of the 
postulations of third person science, it follows that we have reason to believe in something over and 
above the postulations of third-person science.   
Of course, if there were a tension between the reality of consciousness and the reality of 
consciousness and the facts of natural science, then we would have to do some weighing of 
                                                          
15 P. 13. 
16 For example, Pereboom 2011 defends a disjunction of non-panpsychist Russellian monism and illusionism. I 
favour a panpsychist version of Russellian monism (Goff MS), but those impressed by Frankish’s worries need 
not follow me in this.   
epistemic reasons. However, we demonstrated in the last section that there is no such tension. Once 
we have dispelled the worry that consciousness is anomalous by contradiction, the onus is on the 
illusionist to demonstrate that our apparent introspective awareness of consciousness gives us no 
reason to believe in the reality of consciousness. Frankish accepts that it is epistemically permissible 
to believe in the external world on the basis of our senses. Why is it not epistemically permissible to 
believe in phenomenal consciousness on the basis of introspection? 
Frankish points to empirical evidence that first-person judgements are not reliable. But it is a huge 
leap to go from the fact that our putative introspective access to phenomenal consciousness is not 
perfect, to the claim that it has no epistemic force at all. If there is no empirical case against the 
reality of consciousness, all the realist needs to hold is that our apparent introspective awareness of 
phenomenal consciousness gives us reasonable grounds to believe that phenomenal consciousness 
exists. Frankish is obliged to tell us why this belief is unreasonable.  
There are of course epistemic disadvantages pertaining to our epistemic access to consciousness. 
Facts about phenomenal consciousness cannot be inter-subjectively checked in the way that facts 
about the external world can. This is unfortunate, and introduces all sorts of methodological 
difficulties to the science of consciousness. However, I can’t see an argument from the fact that our 
apparent access to phenomenal consciousness is non-ideal to the conclusion that it ought not to be 
trusted at all. Third-person access to the external world is non-ideal either; for example, there seems 
to be no way of purging it of sceptical doubt (Arguably our access to consciousness does not suffer 
from this drawback, but perhaps it would be question begging to assert that in this context). The 
epistemic situation of evolved creatures is significantly inferior to the epistemic situation of angels; 
we’ve got to take what we can get.  
The most interesting arguments Frankish raises against the plausibility of consciousness realism 
focus on the peculiar epistemic relationship that seems to obtain between the mind and its 
conscious states. I will spend the rest of this section focusing on these arguments in some detail.  
Frankish claims that ‘If realists are to maintain that phenomenal consciousness is a datum, then they 
must say that we have a special kind of epistemic access to it, which excludes any possibility of 
error’.17 I am not clear why he thinks that consciousness must be known with certainty in order to be 
a datum; the realist might merely claim that introspection provides good reason to believe in the 
reality of consciousness, just as the senses provide good reason to believe in the external world. Still, 
it is true that many realists, especially those who take consciousness to be irreducible, do believe 
that conscious subjects stand in a special, non-causal relationship of ‘acquaintance’ to their 
conscious states; and that in virtue of the relationship of acquaintance the existence and nature of 
conscious states is known with something close to certainty.18  
Frankish raises a few worries about the relationship of acquaintance: 
First, acquaintance can have no psychological significance. In order to talk or think about our 
phenomenal properties we need to form mental representations of them, and since 
representational processes are potentially fallible, the certainty conferred by acquaintance 
could never be communicated.19  
                                                          
17 P. 18. 
18 Chalmers 2003, Goff 2015, MS. 
19 P. 18. 
In response to this worry we can note that if there is such thing as acquaintance, then it is itself a 
kind of representational process: in being acquainted with pain I represent that property to myself. 
And no consciousness realist that I know of holds that all representations of consciousness are 
certain or infallible; David Chalmers for example holds that only a narrow class of mental concepts – 
those he calls ‘direct phenomenal concepts’ – have this special status. Thus, I can’t see why any 
realist would worry that the certainty involved in acquaintance-based representations of 
consciousness is lost when the content of the concept is incorporated into other representational 
processes. Again Frankish seems to be assuming that the reality of phenomenal consciousness is a 
datum only if it is known with certainty, and I fail to see what reason we have to think that. My 
experience of the table in front of me does not guarantee the table’s existence, but it is nonetheless 
reasonable to believe in the table on the basis of it. 
Second, acquaintance theory assumes that reactions and associations a sensory episode 
evokes do not affects its feel, since we are not directly acquainted with them or their effects. 
Yet there is reason to think that our reactions and associations do shape our sense of what 
our experiences are like.20  
It would be good to hear more detail about how the evidence Frankish references counts against an 
acquaintance model. For the moment I am not clear why the acquaintance theorist cannot accept 
that certain associations and tendencies to react do have a causal impact on phenomenal states, 
phenomenal states which are subsequently known in acquaintance-based representations. And 
given that the acquaintance theorist holds that only a limited subset of representations of 
consciousness involve certainty, she is quite entitled to hold that reactions and associations cause a 
certain amount of misrepresentation among our representations of consciousness. Perhaps there 
are some empirical worries about acquaintance, but I think we need to hear more detail.  
Acquaintance theory also comes with heavy metaphysical baggage. It is hard to see how 
physical properties could directly reveal themselves to us… Moreover, it may require an anti-
physicalist view of the experiencing subject too. If subjects are complex physical organisms, 
how can they become directly acquainted with consciousness?21 
This seems to be an Ockhamist objection to realism about direct acquaintance relations and subjects 
which stand in such relations. But if we have reason to believe in consciousness, and we have reason 
to believe that consciousness involves subjects bearing direct acquaintance relations, then we have 
reason to believe in subjects bearing direct acquaintance relations. If there was a clash between 
acquaintance and our empirical knowledge of person and brain, then we might have grounds for 
rejecting acquaintance. But cognitive science and neuroscience are limited to tracking the 
dispositional features of brains. It could be that the brain also has a categorical nature, and that that 
categorical nature involves a subject bearing direct acquaintance relations. If we have reason to 
believe in consciousness, and this is what consciousness involves, then this is what we ought to 
believe (in the absence of a powerful counter-reason).  
To summarise my argument so far: 
 Frankish has given us no reason to believe that phenomenal consciousness is anomalous by 
inconsistency. Even if the physical world is causally closed, and this has not been adequately 
defended, Russellian monism provides a way of reconciling causal closure with full-blooded 
realism about phenomenal consciousness. 
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 If the conceivability argument or the knowledge argument are sound, then realism about 
phenomenal consciousness requires metaphysical commitments over and above those of 
third-person observation and experiment. However, if we have reason to believe in 
phenomenal consciousness, then we have epistemically legitimate grounds for making those 
additional commitments. And Frankish has given us no good reason to doubt that our 
apparent introspective access to phenomenal consciousness gives us good grounds for 
believing in the reality of phenomenal consciousness (just as our apparent sensory access to 
the external world gives us good grounds for believing in the external world).  
Radical Naturalism 
Why is Frankish so convinced that we have no good reason to believe in consciousness? I suspect 
that the fundamental motivation for Frankish, and for the other illusionists he discusses, is a deep 
commitment to a radical form of methodological naturalism, which we can define as follows: 
Radical naturalism – Third-person observation and experiment, and only third-person 
observation and experiment, should be our guide in finding out the nature of reality.  
The reality of consciousness does not seem to be accessible to third-person observation and 
experiment; I can’t see your pain no matter how much I poke around in your head. And thus if we 
accept radical naturalism, illusionism becomes extremely plausible. The question we now need to 
ask is: What reason do we have to be radical naturalists?  
I believe that the attraction to radical naturalism arises from an emotional response to the success 
of science. It cannot be denied that in the last five hundred years or so the project of natural science 
has gone extremely well. From the movement of the planets, to the evolution of life, to the 
fundamental constituents of matter, natural science seems to be an unstoppable juggernaut of 
explanation. For the radical naturalist, what this shows is that we’ve finally found something that 
works, something we can put our ontological faith in. For thousands of years before the scientific 
revolution philosophers struggled to find out what reality is like and got nowhere. Since the scientific 
revolution natural science has enjoyed success after success after success. From this perspective, 
philosophers who look somewhere other than third-person empirical science to try to work out what 
reality is like are ‘old school’, dragging us back to the dark ages. They are to be equated with folk 
who believe in magic, or deny climate change, or think that the world was created in six days. 
However, there is a deep irony here. A key moment in the scientific revolution was Galileo’s 
declaration that mathematic should be the language of natural science. But Galileo felt able to make 
this declaration only once he had stripped the material world of sensory qualities. For Galileo, 
colours, tastes, smells and odours aren’t really in matter, but in the experiencing soul of the 
perceiver.22 By stripping matter of its qualities, leaving only size, shape, location and motion, Galileo 
gave us, for the first time in history, a material universe which could be exhaustively described in the 
austere language of mathematics.23  
Thus, natural science begins with Galileo limiting its scope of enquiry, by putting the sensory 
qualities in the soul and entreating ‘natural philosophers’ to focus only on what can be captured 
mathematically. This limited project has gone extremely well, allowing the construction of 
mathematical models which yield extremely accurate predictions of the behaviour of matter. This in 
                                                          
22 In contrast to Descartes, Galileo conceived of the soul in Aristotelian terms, as the principle of animation in 
the body (corpo sensitivo). See Ben-Yami 2015 chapter 3 for more discussion of this. 
23 Galileo 1623/1957: 274-7. 
turn has enabled us to manipulate the natural world in extraordinary way, and thus to produce 
technology undreamt of by previous generations. This incredible success has created in 
contemporary philosophers a great desire to place all of their ontological faith in natural science.  
However, it is clear upon calm reflection that the fact that things go really well we ignore the 
sensory qualities gives us absolutely no reason to think that sensory qualities don’t exist. It would be 
nice if we could apply the methods of third-person science to the qualities of experience, but their 
private nature in incompatible with public observation, and (as Galileo realised, and Frankish 
concurs) their qualitative nature resists (exhaustive) mathematical characterisation. This doesn’t 
mean they don’t exist; it just means that the human epistemic situation is far from ideal. We have at 
least as much reason to believe in the qualities of experience – on the basis of introspection – as we 
do to believe in the external world – on the basis of perception. And if we want a complete theory of 
the world, then we must try to construct one which incorporates everything we have reason to 
believe in, not just those things which are easier to deal with. 
Natural science has done an extremely good job of describing the causal structure of matter. The job 
of the metaphysician is to build on this, by developing a theory which unifies the findings of natural 
science with other things we have reason to believe in. What other things do we have reason to 
believe in? At the very least the experiential qualities which Galileo set outside of the scope of 
natural science.  
The project of metaphysics is currently hampered by an understandable but irrational attraction to 
scientism, which results from the visceral impact of technology on philosophical inclinations. So 
much so that the general public has almost no involvement with the metaphysics which goes on in 
philosophy departments, nor even awareness that it is going on. At some point this irrational 
attraction to scientism will fade, and society as a whole will return to the noble project of trying to 
work out what reality is like; this time armed with rich information about the causal structure of 
reality, information which was not available to our ancestors.  
Many bemoan the fact that metaphysics doesn’t seem to have got anywhere. I’m inclined to think it 
hasn’t really begun.   
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